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Abstract: The SPS Agreement in the WTO gives legal validity to the CODEX
standards. Since the developed countries have been at the forefront of
setting the food standards in the CODEX, the developing countries have
been increasingly engaged in the CODEX, and also in the WTO, with an
objective to increase their exports of the agricultural and food products.
But such objective and desire have often been stymied by the lack of
institutions which can sustain the intense technical negotiations at the
CODEX. If these participations are not qualitatively satisfactory, the very
objective of such participations is not fulfilled. But since most of the
developing countries are lacking in such high technical capacity, they are
unable to influence or qualitatively shape the negotiations in the CODEX.
This also impacts their exports of agricultural and food products.
India has been an active member of the WTO. But whether it has been
able to influence or respond to the play of events internationally and
concomitantly balance it with the domestic imperatives that are embedded
in the international legal and technological regimes, institutional capacity
constraints and other social issues. This paper examines such issues, and
also examines some bilateral trade agreements which demonstrate the
mounting pressure on the developing countries to conform to the food
standards of the developed countries.
Keywords: SPS Agreement, Food safety standards, Technology, Bilateral
Trade Agreements
Introduction
The international debate and discourse on food standards in the last
two decades have been punctuated by a number of public health
controversies and international trade disputes resulting at times in trade
embargoes (Isaac and Kerr, 2003). These debates have also been
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characterized by an increasing involvement of the civil society in
questioning both the procedural and the distributive impacts of food
standards setting and their implementation. The discourse has,
therefore, been highly politicized given the high stakes that are involved
in the regime setting and its operation.
Primary reason for the above change has been the international
regulation of food standards that has been recognized and given legal
validity by the international trade regime of the WTO. The focus of
debate has also intensified due to rapid lowering of the tariff barriers
as the focus is shifting to the non-tariff barriers to trade like sanitary
and phyto-sanitary measures and other technical regulations.1 This has
resulted in polarization - a broad international fault line between the
developed and the developing countries, with the former alleging non-
adoption of international standards on food safety by the developing
countries and the latter countering them with arguments relating to
the usage of such standards as disguised restriction to trade in the form
of lack of financial and institutional capacity for the developing
countries to be involved in regime setting and its national
implementation.
If we look closely on the above positions on international food
standards governance, we find that there are mainly three sites of
contestations; the first is the CODEX itself, wherein the international
norms and guidelines are being formulated; the second one is the WTO,
wherein CODEX non-conforming national regimes can be legally
challenged through the dispute settlement process; and the third one
(and also perhaps the most dynamic and most interesting) has been
the bilateral trade agreements between the two largest trade blocks (viz.
the USA and the EU) and the developing countries.
The first site has been in a legitimacy crisis of sorts partly because
of the increasing pressures of negotiating a legal regime through an
institution which has a philosophy based on consensual decision-
making and that is not structurally constructed to provide for equity
in participation. In other words, the institutional process of the CODEX
has been exposed to mounting criticism but the process itself was not
put into place in the first place to address the increasing claims being
made onto it through the WTO mandate that was extended to it. In
that sense, there is a case of disjuncture between the institutional
objectives and the processes on which CODEX was set up and the
extensive demands which were made upon it post-1995 (after the
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establishment of the WTO) through the recognition given to it under
the legal agreements of the international trade regime of the WTO.
The second site is of the WTO which is organically linked in terms
of its operation in extending legal validity to the regime emanating
from the CODEX. Though the disciplines are institutionally linked,
both the negotiation process (to a limited extent) and the dispute
settlement apparatus within the WTO have been extremely dynamic in
terms of two things. First, through the negotiations within the WTO,
developing countries have made a substantial pitch for revisiting
(though to a limited extent) the CODEX policymaking process (Zarrilli
and Musselli, 2004). Second, the dispute settlement process has also
contributed to this process in terms of clarifying and developing
disciplines that have partially responded to the disjuncture that the
post-1995 trade regime has forced upon the international food policy
regime in general.
In contrast to the above, the third site perhaps is the most dynamic
as well as being the one exposed to high drama, given the closed nature
of bilateral international relations and lack of public engagement in
general. Two largest trade blocks, the US and the EC have engaged in
extensive bilateral treaty making driven by the need to co-opt trading
partners to adopt standards mirroring their own domestic regime. The
bilateral trade agreements between the two trading blocks and their
developing country trading partners have come to be increasingly used
to export food safety standards regulation. The trading arrangements
provide adequate arenas since the basket of measures are large and,
therefore, provide flexibility and allow pressure tactics to be deployed
to a considerable extent. Further the one-to-one negotiations procedure
is also ideal, since structurally it is susceptible to pressure tactics.
All these three sites are also characterized as sites of contestations
in their own right, since each display characteristics of individual activity
and, therefore, offer a chance for compromise. However, all three sites
are also dialectically linked together, since each may support, influence
or even provide competition to each other in terms of member countries
using each forum to influence policymaking.
Given the above context, this paper examines the three sites of
debates. It also highlights developments within the national scene,
which are bound to influence international developments and which
may also be influenced by the other. In conclusion the paper gives a
brief background of the domestic food safety regime and highlights a
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particular instance of a sudden shift in policy, which clearly seems to
suggest international pressures emanating from bilateral trading
partners.
Negotiations on Food Standards within the CODEX
Alimentarius Commission
The most important international agency in the arena of food standards
is the Codex Alimentarius Commission or CAC. The WHO and the FAO,
as it is popularly known, set up CAC jointly in 1963. The CAC was set
up primarily as a coordinating agency to facilitate the setting of
standards on food safety and ensure certain standardization in food
trade practices. The membership was and continues to be open to all
FAO and WHO members with a large number of international NGOs
having observer status.2 The organization functions through a network
of regional, commodity specific and general committees that deliberate
on standards. The committees are organized horizontally (general issue
areas), vertically (issues that are specific to some commodities) and in
regional committees, which are aimed at enabling regional consensus
building on region specific standards and issues.3
Before the coming into place of the WTO agreements in 1995, the
deliberations in CODEX used to be largely consensual and non-
posturing in nature. The organization was essentially used as a forum
for discussing and debating scientific information, developing regulatory
best practices and exchanging and dissemination of information on
country practices in the domain of food standards. Direct adoption of
the standards produced by the CAC was at best limited amongst
countries.4 The coming into place of the SPS/TBT Agreements has had
a crucial impact on the functioning and authority of the CODEX.
Post WTO Codex standards carried within a presumption of legality
under the SPS/TBT Agreements. Thus countries adopting CODEX
standards were presumed to be in conformity with their WTO
obligations.5 Though this did not demand strict conformity with the
CODEX standards, countries could only justify their non-adoption by
adhering to strictly defined criteria. The high costs of litigation in the
WTO also meant that adherence to the CODEX standards was a more
cost effective alternative and avoid getting embroiled in disputes within
the WTO. Thus, the CODEX standards not only received legal validity
via its inclusion in the text of the SPS/TBT Agreements but also the
organizational and functional costs of participating in the WTO meant
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that there was/is a real (albeit negative) incentive in the adoption of
these standards (Appleton, 2000). Another important aspect of the legal
effect of the CODEX is the definition of international standards includes
standards, guidelines and recommendations.6 In this context one could
safely draw the conclusion that the SPS extends legal validity to all
recommendations of the CODEX without any differentiation.
Post WTO has also witnessed the growing importance of the
CODEX standards. However, it has also been subjected to a slew of
criticisms focusing on systems of participation for members, processes
of deliberation, etc.7 Various committees operating under the CODEX
are hosted by the individual governments. The host country member
has a significant leeway in agenda setting within the committee. Further,
the increasing use of the voting system to adopt standards within the
CAC (in lieu of a consensual process) has also contributed to the
legitimacy crisis facing the CODEX. Moreover, developing countries
also complain that standards in developed countries are in some instances
more stringent than the CODEX standards (Brack, Falkner and Goll,
2003), and, therefore, there is always a pressure within the CODEX to
continuously upgrade standards to more stringent level. One of the
reasons for this is the slow pace of standards development within the
CODEX and the faster pace of standards development in developed
countries.8 This has led to a viscous circle having a spiraling effect on
stringency of the standards given the developed countries wariness to
downgrade standards within their domestic jurisdictions.
The CODEX in the post 1995 phase, after it was referred to as an
acceptable standard benchmarking agency by the WTO, has, therefore,
witnessed widening and deepening of the negotiations taking place
within it. In terms of subject matter the number of food standards
deliberated within the CODEX has increased exponentially over the
last decade. Also the nature of factors and criteria underlying a scientific
standard has also proven to be a point of contention in the CODEX.
The Procedural Manual of the Codex Commission differentiates between
risk assessment and risk management with reference to food standards.9
It defines risk assessment as purely a scientific process and the latter as
a policy process that includes consultation with a range of interested
parties and weighing of alternatives. This kind of a divisive frame of
reference is organically linked with that of the acceptance of the role
of “other legitimate factors” within the decision-making framework of
the CODEX – meaning within the domain of risk management. The
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manual provides for several caveats in the operation of “other legitimate
factors”, viz. putting an additional burden on managers to “indicate
how these factors affect the selection of risk management options and
the development of standards, guidelines and related text”. It further
stipulates that the consideration of these factors “should not affect
the scientific basis of risk analysis”, thereby clearly extending primary
importance to scientific outputs from the risk assessment, over that of
“other legitimate factors”. Moreover, it considerably limits the scope of
“other legitimate factors” by specifying that only those factors that
have a world-wide/regional basis should be incorporated (thus negating
territorially limited factors that may have an impact nationally).
Singularly the manual exhibits some awareness of the challenges faced
by developing countries in undertaking risk assessment and states that
“particular constraints of the production or processing methods, transport, storage
especially in developing countries may be considered”10 (emphasis added).
In this case, therefore, the manual makes an exception and uses non-
obligatory language and in effect substantially waters down the legal
effect of the aforementioned section.
One horizontal issue that has proved to be contentious within
the CODEX is the definition and scope of the “precautionary principle”.
The lack of agreement between members has resulted in a compromise
leading to the adoption of the following position in 2001: “When
there is evidence that a risk to human health exists but scientific data
are insufficient or incomplete, the Commission should not proceed to
elaborate a standard but should consider elaborating a related text,
such as a code of practice, provided that such a text would be supported
by available scientific evidence”. This is indeed problematic especially
given that the WTO does not differentiate between standards, codes or
guidelines. Thus, the legal validity of a “code of practice” emanating
from CODEX would be akin to the standards or guidelines proscribed
by it under WTO law.11
Another important area of discussion has been the definition of
“other legitimate factors” in the context of the decision-making within
CODEX. Discussions on this issue have been divisive and there is yet to
be an agreement on what constitutes “other legitimate factors”. However,
the statement of principles provides for certain critical caveats that will
have an import on the discussions and could very well limit its scope.
First it reiterates the separation between the risk assessment and the
risk management processes in order to secure the sanctity of the former
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and ensure that it only has a scientific basis. It also states that CODEX
will consider only those factors which have a regional or a worldwide
reach and not those that are territorially limited within a nation state.
Thus, the geographical reach or scope of the factor is an important
prerequisite for its consideration within the CODEX. Further, the
Statement also takes into account the particular circumstance of the
developing countries in evaluating the feasibility of the risk management
preferences that are adopted within the CODEX, thereby providing for
a consideration of extraneous factors – “other legitimate factors” in
negotiating and mandating standards. It also stipulates that in the
case of forwarding of economic interests and trade issues which are
considered to be germane to standards setting within the CODEX,
quantifiable data should be made available to support them.
The above discussion highlights some of the tensions, which are
prevalent within the various committee negotiations in the CODEX.
There have been concerted efforts on the part of developed countries
to push for an exclusively “science based” risk management techniques.
However, this assumption has been questioned by social scientists and
management theorists who have denied the claims of neutrality of
science (Walker, 2003) and have reiterated the non-scientific aspects of
determination of standards of risk. Criticisms of the CODEX have also
been targeted at the inequalities of participation embedded within the
functioning of the various committees and task forces.12 The report of
the evaluation of CODEX has also commented on the growing
frustrations of the LDCs and the developing country in fully
participating in the deliberations of the CODEX.13
Legal commentators like Livermore have sought to characterize
such tensions as a “legitimacy dilemma” faced by the CODEX resulting
from the expanded organisational mandate backed by the international
institutional mechanism of the WTO. 14 He has highlighted the change
in the nature and political culture of the negotiations within the
CODEX, given the high stakes. From an external perspective this also
means that the CODEX negotiations have attracted considerable criticism
from the international civil society. Livermore also points out that the
WTO agreements provides for a balancing of interests given the
separation and the institutional differentiation of powers. He calls this
“institutional differentiation” and understates its importance in
functioning as a balancing of interest mechanism, and then goes on
to argue that the judicial review function of the WTO tribunals (Panels
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and the Appellate Body) enables it to undertake a procedural review of
standards setting activities within the CODEX. In defense of this
contention he marshals jurisprudence from the EC-Sardines case15,
wherein the AB had undertaken a review of the internal decision-making
processes of the CODEX. He has also demonstrated that the
developments of administrative law principles like due process and
transparency requirements have come to characterize Appellate Body
deliberations.16 In this context main thesis is that the Appellate Body is
empowered to review CODEX decisions on the basis of transparency
and other procedural bars that would to an extent address the claims
of a crisis of legitimacy brewing within the CODEX.
Bilateral Agreements and Its Influence on Food Safety
Standards
“Our SPS standards are not open to negotiation, and they apply in
full to all trade: preferential as well as non-preferential.”
— European Agricultural Commissioner Mariann
Fischer Boel (Sixth Meeting of the International Centre for
Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies, CIHEAM)
This comment perhaps best illustrates both the inflexibility and
also the resolve of the EU (mirrors that of the USA) to influence trading
partners to grant the same level of protection and also to adapt (and
in most cases transpose) their domestic food safety framework to match
the EU/USA regimes (Paarlberg, R, 2002). In this section we would study
two such examples of bilateral trade agreements - EU-Chile Association
Agreement and the United States-Panama Agreement that have a well-
detailed chapter on SPS standards. 17 From these chapters it is apparent
that they have been negotiated keeping in mind the EU/USA standards.
These two agreements are both similar and dissimilar in certain aspects.
They are similar because, they represent the intense drive of these two
trading nations/community to push for harmonization of SPS
standards. However, they are starkly different in their choice of
methodology. The EU-Chile Association agreement focuses largely on
laying down structural linkages between the regulatory systems of the
two countries – enabling close cooperation both the formation and
operation of SPS measures and mechanisms. The US-Panama agreement,
on the other hand, is more direct in its approach, where the US uses its
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historical linkages with its neighbouring countries like Panama to push
through an extensive equivalence project that effectively narrows down
the room for maneuver (respond to their own domestic priorities and
conditions) to partner countries like Panama.
(a)  EU-Chile Association Agreement
At the time of its signing the EU-Chile Association Agreement was one
of the most far reaching agreements as it clearly went beyond the
traditional areas associated within trade agreements. As the name
suggests – the association agreement – is designed to be comprehensive
and cover a wide range of social, economic and technical cooperation.
The inclusion of trade as one of the issues covered within the agreement
influenced the coverage of trade issues within the agreement itself.
Analysis of the agreement reveals that the provisions were a far-reaching
extension in providing for close regulatory cooperation between the
authorities of the two countries so as to preempt any conflict of interest
in terms of their sanitary and phytosanitary standards. Thus, addressing
trade issues through an association agreement provided an avenue to
push for closer regulatory cooperation on trade issues.
The section on equivalence is comprehensive and is integrated
into Annex IV of the Agreement. The provisions provide for strong
cooperation between the Chilean and the EU authorities in standards,
technical regulations and conformity assessment. Further, the agreement
also identifies international and European standards as benchmarks to
which Chilean standards should be based on (Christoforou, 2004).
This also illustrates drive for the integration of the EU standards into
the agreement along with international standards, which are recognized
under the WTO Agreements. The agreement also puts into place stringent
conformity assessment structures and procedures as conformity
assessments are popular tools within association agreements in
stimulating greater oversight and monitoring and evaluation of
regulatory measures within the domestic jurisdiction of trading partners.
The development of animal welfare standards in particular received
special attention within the Association agreement. Articles 2, 3 and
Appendix 1c deal with the stunting and slaughter of animals. The
preamble of Annex IV of the agreement specifically mentions the
development of an international animal welfare standard as one of
the aims of the Association agreement. This in itself is not incongruous
with the current policy of the OIE (World Organization for Animal
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Health), which has sought to focus actively on the development of
animal welfare standards. However, what requires attention is that of
placing such an aim within the standard aims of the agreement itself.
In this context the agreement itself becomes a vehicle for harmonization
and also a site for active negotiation on the development of
“international standards”. Further, the terms and broader contours of
such future negotiations would be circumscribed by the provisions of
the agreement. The agreement thus binds the parties to future
negotiations on international standards that go much beyond the
dictates of multilateral negotiations within the WTO.
Lastly the agreement is also characterized by the strong periodical
institutionalized forms of information exchange and refers to regulatory
convergence and compatibility between the domestic regimes of the
trading partners. This direct reference to convergence and compatibility
is not surprising given the aims of the association agreement. Further,
the institutionalized nature of information exchange and mechanism
for cooperation anticipates domestic regulatory changes and equips
the partners to provide for advanced notice of such changes and more
onerously the need to take into account the views of the trading partner
in envisaging and developing domestic regulatory regimes in related
areas. This in a manner legitimizes and leverages the role of trading
partners from that of external influencing domestic regulatory policy
to that of demanding attention and consideration of their viewpoints
in decisions governing the domestic policy regimes. This conceptually
radicalizes their involvement and influence to influence and shape policy
making nationally.
(b) The United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement
The US-Panama TPA was signed in June 2007, after three years of
protracted negotiations between the two sides. Soon thereafter the
Panama government got a swift approval of their legislature with an
overwhelming majority voting in favour of the agreement. But the US
Congress has refused to give it their stamp of approval till now, though
reports of late suggest that there are some positive movements within
the US domestically on this.18
Although the agreement is yet to receive congressional approval,
the scope and value of this agreement to both these trading partners
are not in doubt. Given both the geopolitical and the direct trading
interests relating to the Panama Canal Authority, the US is admittedly
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keen on cementing its strategic ties with this Central American republic.
Similarly, for Panama hopes of gaining unilateral trade privileges from
the US would help it to compete with the Caribbean nations that have
been enjoying liberalized tariff regime for both the US and EU markets
under the GSP scheme of trade preferences. It will also enable it to
leverage its role as a US trading partner in a region characterized by
traditional US opponents. This would then seem to relate to a win-win
situation for both the countries; however, the devil in this case lies in
the details. An analysis of the text of both the free trade agreement
and the single focus agreement on SPS measures would prove the degree
of one sidedness, which both these texts exude. Herein we would focus
on certain aspects of the free trade agreement and discuss the rationale
for establishing a separate agreement on SPS measures.19
Amongst one of the innovations, which have been made in this
FTA, is the introduction of the special category called “Special Regimes”.20
This is listed under Chapter 3 “national treatment and market access to
goods” section, and refers to waiver of custom duties. This section
(Article 3.4) creates a legal bar against the revision of the customs waivers
adopted under this agreement if it is conditioned on the fulfillment of
a performance requirement. The caveat attached to this is that it could
be an “explicit or implicit” conditionality, essentially debars any course
of action. Under this articles Panama retains the right to maintain
existing measures, which are inconsistent, under two conditions. First,
that they should be consistent with Article 27.4 of the SCM Agreement.
Second, that Panama “may not” maintain such measures after December
31, 2009. It is quite obvious that given such a deadline, Panama will be
under immense pressure to withdraw the current regime of customs
waiver that are external to this agreement.
The Agreement also contains a specific chapter on Sanitary and
Phyto-sanitary Measures. The chapter only affirms the application of
the SPS Agreement of the WTO and sets up a consulting and facilitating
mechanism in the form of a Committee on Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary
measures. Further, the scope of the chapter is wide and, therefore, refers
“all” SPS measures that may directly or indirectly affect trade. Amongst
the Committee’s various functions, it also provides for a forum for
prior consensus building on issues and positions in international SPS
bodies like the Codex, WTO SPS committee, International Plant
Protection Convention amongst others. This is another related trend
that is being reflected in such FTAs. Such institutions in reality create a
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practical imperative to undertake consultations with ones’ trading
partner on decisions, which should be taken on the basis of national
trade priorities. This also highlights the essentially territorial21 nature
of the side effects of such agreements between two unequal trading
partners. The agreement puts into place a self-progressing mechanism,
which would catalyze closer trade relations between the partners on an
ever expanding range of issues – which may not even have featured in
the text of the agreement. This is illustrated by the US-Panama FTA in
which, although the substantive provisions are limited, the setting up
of the Committee and the role and scope determination of the
committee has set up a process with a self momentum. On a more
pragmatic note, the setting up of a Committee and the lack of any
substantive obligations reflects the lack of agreement between Panama
and the US at that point of time. It also, therefore, highlighted the
need to negotiate a separate agreement on the outstanding SPS issues
in the future. The signing of the US-Panama SPS Agreement is a
fulfillment of that need.
The latent trigger to the signing of this single focus agreement on
SPS measures between the US and Panama has its genesis in the Panama’s
requirement conducting individual audits by national authorities of
the US manufacturing processes, facilities and export shipments that
export agricultural products to Panama. The US was keen to ensure
that such far-reaching administrative requirements would be done away
with and replace them by a wide ranging equivalence measures. The
importance of these measures also underlines the need for a separate
agreement rather than including such issues within the larger radius of
the proposed US-Panama free trade agreement.
The Agreement primarily focuses on three sectors, viz. meat
(including but not limited to beef and pork), poultry and its products
and processed food (including dairy products). The essential thrust of
the Agreement is to recognize and validate the certification provided
to the US exports in these sectors by the domestic regulatory authorities
without the necessity to undergo the quality controls by the authorities
in Panama. The reason behind this is that all these three commodities
form the most protected products and almost 40 per cent of the imports
from the US. The US in many bilateral forums had contended that
process of certification of individual US manufacturing/processing firms
by the Panama authorities have been a procedurally cumbersome and
an expensive process.22 Panama has thus in pursuance to the Agreement
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agreed that it would not require “any additional certification statements
to the standard applicable US export certificate, except as provided in
this Agreement.”23
Another important aspect is its focus on laying down procedural
time lines. Article 7 of the Agreement specifies that in case of obtaining
product registration statement from the Panama Food Safety Authority,
the time line have been fixed at “one working day of receiving basic
product information about a product”. This is indeed unprecedented
in terms of the reach of bilateral agreements. Providing for fixed time
lines in case of regulatory approvals and specifying automatic issuance
product registration certification. These further illustrate the intrusive
nature of the Agreement and its impact and influence and fashioning
domestic regulatory approvals. Moreover, the Agreement states that,
also in cases of animal diseases, viz. avian influence and Newcastle
disease, Panama will accept the internal regulatory certificates of the
USDA (United States Department of Agriculture) FSIS Export Certificate,
as valid. Although this is in conformity with the OIE (World
Organization for Animal Health) guidelines, there are very few instances
where countries have accepted such measures of equivalence.
In the specific case of importation and sale of beef and beef
products, Panama is obligated to “continue to recognize, the US beef
grading system, and US beef cuts nomenclature, without review or
further action.” This is indeed unprecedented, that a bilateral agreement
would aim to constrain further action or even review of present domestic
measures. This goes much beyond what is meant by equivalence. Since
the idea and commitment towards equivalence is an act of recognition
of the measures of a trading partner as in conformity (and therefore
having the same legal effect as) with domestic regulatory measures. In
this case, however, not only is there a legal obligation on Panama to
recognize current standards of the US, but of more concern is that
censure on future domestic policy changes. Puritans would argue that
an international agreement being a legal contract, it is possible to
withdraw and rescind from it. However, realistically this is not an option
open to Panama, given the historical linkages (both trade and politics)
between the two countries.
The above discussion quite clearly elucidates the extensive nature
of commitments that Panama has undertaken in the context of SPS
measures (with reference to specific goods) with the United States. This
is not surprising given the earlier regulatory regime wherein Panama
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maintained that specific regulatory procedures have been seen to be an
expensive exercise and also very time intensive. Nevertheless what is
indeed surprising is the nature and scope of this Agreement in terms of
mandating detailed and rather sweeping “prior information” and
notification commitments preceding any review or change in the
regulatory regime by Panama.24 This will of course facilitate bilateral
policymaking in this area; nevertheless the provisions of this Agreement
are quite clearly SPS plus in nature and this potentially could constrain
the domestic regulatory flexibility of Panama.
What does the above analysis portend for the ongoing India-EU
FTA negotiations? There are primarily two issues to which attention
could be drawn in this regard. First is that of the SPS standards
themselves. As is evident from the analysis of the above two FTAs, India
should expect pressure from the EU to agree to extensive harmonization
of its legal instruments and institutional infrastructure governing SPS.
This would be in terms of accepting the protocols established by EU
certification authorities and in the Indian scenario adopting those or
similar protocols with the promise of guaranteeing faster and more
effective access to the EU markets. As has been witnessed in the US-
Panama SPS Agreement, this could either be limited to a few products
to begin with but thereafter there will be pressure to extend it to the
entire product line being negotiated under the FTA.  Second also at the
level of regulatory approvals, there may be pressure to streamline the
process in terms of specifying strict time lines for gaining such approvals.
More importantly, however, it is the review and consultation that are
mandated before any change of policy on the regulatory fronts that is
of concern. As seen from the earlier discussion, it could be expected
that similar responsibilities be specified in the agreement that would
make incumbent on India to consult with the EU before undertaking
any exercise of review and revision of the current regulatory standard
specifically with reference to the SPS measures. This cannot and should
not be acceptable to India on grounds that it would be undermine the
policy flexibility that is required to design and implement a regime
that addresses its domestic priorities.
Institutionally there could be demands made similar to those under
the US-Panama FTA. This refers to the setting up of a joint committee
to facilitate consultation on SPS measures. Although such an institution
can be helpful, however it should be noted that the mandate of such a
consultative mechanism needed to be clarified. In the case of an open
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mandate on engagement there may be pressure to subsequently enlarge
the mandate given the new circumstances. Thus, if India does enter
into such a mechanism with the EU it would need to be very clear on
the purpose, duration and draw a clear mandate for such a mechanism.
The Home Front
In this section we study the domestic institutional and regulatory
landscape on food safety in India. This is an important and crucial
part of this issue area. Given the fast moving pace of international
developments on this issue, it is imperative that our domestic regime is
both well entrenched but also flexible enough to address the
international demands made on it. In this specific case, a country’s
negotiating prowess on a specific subject/issue area is largely contingent
on the development of its domestic regime and its independent and
effective functioning. It is also important at the level of providing crucial
national experiential data in equipping negotiators with a knowledge
base and multiplicity of choices in designing institutions and regulatory
instruments that best reflect the domestic priorities and also fulfill our
international obligations as a country.  In this regard the following
analysis reflects on the institutional aspects of the regulatory bodies
dealing with food safety in the country. It also highlights few of the
problems of regulatory uncertainty that may be created due to lack of
clear mandate of functioning bodies.
The primary aim in highlighting such domestic fissures is to
illustrate the highly contested nature of domestic policy making itself
on this issue. This further complicates policymaking domestically and
could potentially have a negative impact in terms of coordination
between the different lead agencies in the international negotiations
spanning the CBD (Chazournes. and Thomas et al. 2000), WTO and
the CODEX committees. Following, therefore, is an overview of the
regulatory landscape in India and some of the fissures therein.
In India, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) is
the oversight authority for food safety. For nearly five decades the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (PFA), which was enacted in 1954,
has been the sole legislation on food safety in India. The primary
objective of this legislation was to ensure consumer safety through
preventing fraud and deception in food manufacturing and marketing.
Since the food safety is a subject that is part of the concurrent list, the
enforcement of the Act is the primary responsibility of the State/Union
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Territory governments. The role of the MoHFW is advisorial in nature
other than few of the statutory functions that it undertakes. The
MoHFW is also the designated National Codex Contact Point in India.
The National Codex Committee was constituted as an overview agency
under which there are twenty-four shadow Committees in concomitance
with those in the CODEX that essentially follows the international
developments in the committees and helps in preparation of India’s
submissions.
In August 2006, the entire food safety law in India was overhauled
through the enactment of the Food Safety and Standards Act. One of
the main features of the enactment is the setting up of the Food Safety
and Standards Authority. This provides for a one point regulatory
oversight over the entire food chain. This illustrates a shift away, in
many ways, from the earlier regulatory ethos of focusing on enforcement
mechanisms on the end of the food chain sold in the market to a more
preventive approach to risk assessment and reduction of such risk. The
primary aim is to deploy regulation at points where it is most effective
like in the HACCP classification systems.
Nevertheless despite the enactment of this legislation several delays
in notifying the legislation have meant that there is a grey area of
regulatory oversight that has been created largely by default. Though
the food regimes is to be under the authority of the Food Standards
and Safety Authority, the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF)
has continued to be in charge of the environmental health impacts of
food safety regime specifically with reference to the genetically modified
foods regime. This follows through from the parameters set up within
the Environmental Protection Act 1986, through the notification setting
up of the entire regulatory apparatus of approval of GM crops. Thus
since the most important international instrument on GM crops have
been developed within the larger framework of the CBD (Convention
on Biological Diversity), i.e. the Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity
(Katz, D,2001).
The Cartagena Protocol is essentially an international
environmental regime that provides for a system of institutional and
regulatory standards that delimits the functioning of the regime. The
regime was developed in response to the environmental risks emanating
from the international export and import of LMOs (Living Modified
Organisms – the name used to refer to the GMOs under the CPB).
Thus, the location of the food safety regime within the ministry of
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environment was partly a reflection of the international institutional
arrangements, but also addressed the unique threats that emanate from
the development of GM crops within agriculture.
A second aspect, before discussing the implications of such an
institutional location, two preliminary points needs to be made. First
it is important to keep in mind that though in this section, regime
location is construed as crucial facet of regime architecture, it does not
in any way deny the numerous influences both domestic and
international in determining regime development and functionalities.
Second, one of the inherent assumptions of this facet of examination
is that there are certain forms and processes of regime architecture which
the location of the Ministry of Environment privileges over others and
that has certain implications of the nature and operation of the food
safety regime itself and most importantly for its development.25 The
GM regime exemplifies the importance of this contextual dynamics of
regime location. The Indian environmental regime governing GM crops
has a long history. India was one of the early subscribers to a specialized
GM environmental governance regime. The notification on GM
regulation was brought into place as early as in 1989.  Interestingly this
was before any known commercial plans to invest in GM research were
unveiled in India.  Such a precautionary posturing could perhaps be
attributed to the domestic judicial drive that was witnessed during the
late eighties through the nineties on environmental issues and the
executive response to it. This period also saw the overhauling of the
environmental regime in form of the enactment of the Environmental
Protection Act, 1986.
However, thereafter especially through the late nineties, the techno-
optimism that characterized the investment and development of
biotechnology saw a clear posturing of the government to go slow on
regulations. This was also evidenced by the clear lack of regulatory
control in terms of institutional capacities that were pre-requisites for
the legislative oversight. Another proof of the government stand was
also the sudden change of government policy by proceeding with an
executive order (notification) in mid-August last year.26 The notification
essentially used an exception clause enabling the MoEF to provide for
the non-application of the notification if it so warranted. The
notification does not provide for specific conditions under which the
ministry can take such a position and therefore provides for wide
discretionary powers to the MoEF. This per se is not legally problematic
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but in case of abuse of such discretion in clear violation of the legislative
intent underlying the enactment of the GM notification, this may be
legally challenged. The August notification of the MoEF essentially
provides for a blanket exemption of GM regulatory oversight on the
imported GM food. This is surprising given that there has been no
overall policy change in the government on such issues. Further, there
has been a significant rise in the import of GM food especially through
the rise of retailed vegetable shopping chains. Also this kind of a stand
is very much opposite to the government of India’s international stand
on eco-labelling of GM food at the CODEX.  Since then there has been
a case filed against this order in the Supreme Court, and the Ministry
has put the notification in abeyance for a period of six months pending
further direction from the Food Safety and Standards Authority under
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.27
The above is just one of the various illustrations that characterize
the conflictual and highly contesting nature of the food safety
administration in the country. Thus, it would be naïve to imagine that
even having a consolidated authority would iron out all the problems,
specifically because in the context of the environmental health aspects
of GM food would require the expertise of the MoEF. In that sense it is
critical that any such step would have to be supported by a clear plan
of inter-ministerial action and support structure that would enable
effective oversight of food safety in India. Such inter-ministerial
deliberation and action is also critical in providing for a formative
strategy in dealing with international negotiations at different forums
on food safety. Thus, other than the MoEF, the MoHFW, it is the
Ministry of Commerce which would have to be involved in the
coordination of such responses, given that it is in  overall charge of the
international trade negotiations both at the bilateral level and at the
multilateral institutional level of the WTO.
Concluding Remarks
Discussion in the above sections highlights the contested nature of the
sites of international decision-making on food safety. This contestation
is not necessarily a negative issue, since it also illustrates the diverse
nature of the actors that are involved and, therefore, have to be
accommodated within the different forums (Anderson and Nielsen,
2004). However, what is quite apparent are the increasing demands
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that emanate from such forums on the developing countries to
participate and influence standard setting related decision-making
therein. What is of concern is the privileging of bilateral forums over
multilateral ones in the drive for harmonization on food safety regimes.
Given the inherently unequal nature of these forums, it creates
tendencies for inordinate influence of the larger trading partner (Barton,
1996). This is quite apparent from two instances of such bilateral
agreement analyzed in this paper.
In this context one would need to underline a couple of caveats.
First, food safety regulation within the trade regime would take
centerpiece given the increasing use of non-tariff barriers by countries
while regulating trade. Second, this would automatically raise the profile
of bodies like CODEX in terms of authorizing regulations that lay down
the basis of food safety regulations that are recognized as “legitimate”
within the framework of the WTO (Bentley, 2001). Third, this creates
institutional pressures within the CODEX to respond to the demands
of the variety of actors that are interested in participating in the
deliberations. These issues of legitimacy would have to be addressed
both within the CODEX and/or through the other forums like the
dispute settlement or through the various committees of the WTO
wherein procedural requirements could be debated and adopted in order
to guide decision-making within the CODEX. It is also important to
focus on bilateral developments and resist pressures from larger trading
partners in adopting standards that clearly go beyond those mandates
under the SPS Agreement. Herein it is important to reiterate that
multilateral forums like the CODEX or the WTO remain ideal
institutionally to provide for negotiations on this issue, given the nature
and scope of the food safety regulation.
At the national level, the setting up of the Food Safety and
Standards Authority is a critical institutional innovation in the context
of the food safety regime. Given the institutional convergence that is
required between the MoEF, MoHFW and the Ministry of Commerce,
having a one point institutional mechanism is required. Further, food
safety within the context of international negotiations is shared across
international negotiating platforms like that of the CBD, WTO and
the CODEX. Thus, it is important that there is sustained and regular
interactions that are institutionalized through the oversight of the Food
Safety and Standards Authority.
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